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The Islamic economy: its origin, its world view and 
its claims 
 
Hans VISSER  
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Abstract: 
 
Aim: This article takes a critical look at the claims made by advocates of an Islamic economy, in 
particular that it differs fundamentally from capitalism and socialism because it is built “on a superior 
ethical basis. The aim is to find out whether this claim can be creditably sustained and why it is made.  
 
Design: The world view behind the Islamic economy is probed into by means of a literature study 
encompassing publications by prominent students of Islam and Islamic economics, predominantly 
themselves Muslims, which have appeared in a wide range of professional books, magazines and paper 
series.  
 
Conclusions: It is concluded that an Islamic economic system does not differ fundamentally from 
mixed-economy non-Islamic ones and that there is little reason for non-Muslims to accord Islamic 
ethics special status. Further, it is found that important drivers of the attempts to Islamize the economy 
are frustration about the sorrow state of the Islamic world at least since the early nineteenth century and 
a wish to regain something of its former glory. In other words, identity politics is at play. There may an 
element of subjectivity in this conclusion, as it depends on interpretations that are hard to prove or 
disprove conclusively, but statements by leading Muslim advocates of Islam economists give it weight. 
The conclusion may help to interpret developments in the Muslim world, which is an indispensable 
step in finding a way to deal with them. 
 
Key words: Relation of Economics to Social Values, History of Economic Thought since 1925, 
Financial Economics, Monetary Systems, Financial Institutions and Services, Comparative Financial 
Markets and Institutions, Comparative Economic Systems, Religion) 
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1. Introduction  
 
Advocates of Islamic finance and of other forms of an Islamic economy claim 
that the Islamic economy is a system that is fundamentally different from other 
systems, being based on an ethical basis that is lacking in other systems. In order to 
find out why this claim is made and whether there is supporting evidence, the world 
view behind the Islamic economy is probed into: how do the advocates of the 
Islamic economy look at the world and the role or the duty of Muslims in it. We start 
with an account of the genesis of the idea of an Islamic economy that led to the 
foundation of specifically Islamic financial institutions. This is followed by a sketch 
of the worldview behind the Islamic economy and this world view is confronted 
with conventional capitalism. Next, the standard check list of Islamic economic 
ethics, a major ingredient of the Islamic world view, is discussed. Then I point to 
two issues where the Islamic economy, and again Islamic finance in particular, has 
some catching up to do, namely environmental, social and governance issues (ESG) 
and income distribution, and the article wraps up with a confrontation between the 
professed ethics and the real world of the Islamic economy and an attempt to find 
the driving motives behind the Islamic world view. The tone may be quite critical at 
times, but I have no axe to grind and my critique is to a large extent shared by 




2. The genesis of the Islamic economy 
 
In the heyday of the Abbasid caliphate (750-1258) Baghdad became a 
flourishing centre of science, philosophy and invention. This ended with the sacking 
of Baghdad by Mongol forces in 1258, but its intellectual pre-eminence had already 
been eroding. One important factor was that less and less room was available for 
ijtihad, independent judicial reasoning by a qualified legal scholar leading to new 
legal rules. Ijtihad is one of the secondary sources of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh; 
the Quran and the Hadith, that is the acts and utterances of the prophet Muhammad, 
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being the primary sources. Ijtihad was widely applied in deciding what was 
admissible and what not when new products were developed, new kinds of trade 
relations developed, new political organizations arose, new inventions were made, 
new medical techniques were developed and so on. It made for flexibility and easy 
acceptance of change in society. However, fiqh scholars from the ninth century 
onwards increasingly argued that all important questions had been settled and that 
the then existing fiqh body was sufficient to answer all questions (Schacht 1982: 70; 
Hallaq 1984; Ebrahim, Sheikh 2018). Measures taken by the founder of the Mamluk 
sultanate of Egypt, al-Malik al-Zahir Baybars, who had made the Mamluks the 
dominant force in the Islamic Middle East after the demise of the Abbasid caliphate, 
accelerated this process. In 1265 he appointed one supreme judge for each of the 
four great Sunni law schools in order to bring some uniformity and predictability in 
jurisdiction, which he felt was necessary for strong centralized government. He 
furthermore required all judges to stick to the doctrine of the law school to which 
they belonged and follow judgements of earlier law scholars from their own school, 
rather than apply ijtihad. Baybars imposed this system first in Cairo and next in 
Damascus (Allan 2019). Also in the thirteenth century, the Islamic world was 
confronted by the Reconquista, the conquering of Islamic-held territory in the 
Iberian peninsula by Christian kingdoms, and by the Mongol invasion. There was a 
feeling that God had withdrawn his favour from Muslims and that to win it back 
Muslims had to follow the divine laws without questioning. There was no longer a 
place for rationalism, doubt had to replaced by certainty (de Bellaigue 2018: xxxv) 
By the fourteenth century it was agreed among the fiqh scholars, in Sunni Islam at 
least, that there was no place any longer for ijtihad and that ‘the gate of ijtihad’ had 
closed (Egger 2018: 63-64). This meant that intellectual curiosity was frowned 
upon, as it could easily lead to fitna, that is schism, social unrest, seditious dissent, 
civil war.  
The Renaissance that transformed Europe between the fourteenth century and 
the seventeenth century left the Islamic world thus largely untouched and ‘largely’ 
became ‘totally’ when the Ottoman political and religious leaders, horrified when 
they saw how Martin Luther’s attacks on the abuses of the Roman Catholic church 
went viral thanks to the printing press, took care not to let anything similar happen 
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in their empire (Rubin 2017: chapter 6). There was no lively public debate, no 
exchange of new ideas over large areas, no empirical experimentation, no setting up 
of scientific organizations such as the Royal Society (1660) in England, no press 
disseminating news and trade information, no development of new machinery, such 
as James Hargreaves’s spinning Jenny and James Watt’s steam engine, no advance 
in medical knowledge, such as the development of the smallpox vaccine by Edward 
Jenner in 1796, and no chemical science as for instance developed by Robert Boyle 
and Joseph Louis Gay-Lussac. Nothing of this kind was remotely possible in the 
Islamic world under the fierce opposition of the ulama, the religious scholars, 
whether or not hand in glove with the worldly rulers, against any innovation and 
with the abysmally low prevailing literacy rates. In the early nineteenth century 
literacy in the Ottoman empire is reported to have been no more than two or three 
per cent, whereas in England and the Dutch Republic it was already over 50 per cent 
by 1700 (Rubin 2017: 107, 198).  
In the nineteenth century the Islamic world was rudely confronted with the fact 
that European countries were far ahead in science, education, medicine, transport, 
military organization, industry and communication and that the gap was widening 
rapidly. Strongmen such as Muhammad Ali Pasha, who ruled Egypt (formally as 
Ottoman viceroy) from 1805 to 1849, and Mahmud II, who reigned as the Ottoman 
sultan from 1808 to 1839, enforced modernization, ruthlessly suppressing all 
opposition (de Bellaigue 2018). Islam played no role whatsoever in the 
achievements of nineteenth-century progress and Europeans, joined by intellectuals 
from the Islamic world, saw it as an obscurantist remnant. There were, however, 
Muslims who agreed that Islam had become fossilized but reacted by preaching a 
much more liberal form of Islam than what had become the mainstream. One man 
who stood out was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). As European countries 
became more openly imperialist in the Middle East and Northern Africa as the 
nineteenth century wore on – Tunisia for instance became a French colony in 1881 
and Britain took control of Egypt in 1882, while the French had already taken over 
Algeria in 1830 – aversion to European influence grew (India, Ceylon and the Dutch 
East Indies had been colonized earlier). Building on this aversion he inspired a pan-
Islamist movement that united the Muslim world against European imperialism. 
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This was possible thanks to much better communication as travel became ever 
easier, education improved and the printing press at last became common in the 
Islamic world, offering a propagation mechanism for revolutionary ideas as it had 
done more than three centuries earlier in Western Europe for Martin Luther’s 
denouncement of the Roman Catholic Church’s malpractices. In 1899 al-Afghani’s 
pupil Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was named Grand Mufti of Egypt, the highest 
authority on Islamic jurisprudence and the head of Egypt’s religious law courts, by 
the khedive (Ottoman viceroy; a mufti is an Islamic lawyer who is authorized to 
issue a fatwa, or legal opinion).
 
Abduh shook up al-Azhar University, introducing 
secular subjects and modern sanitary conditions, and he propagated an enlightened 
Islam that no longer denied a place for human reasoning, thus reviving ijtihad. He 
even maintained that the Quran, the holy scripture of Islam, could be interpreted 
differently according to time and place and that it might contain errors, introduced 
by humans. This was, and is, anathema to mainstream Muslims and met with fierce 
opposition. Instrumental in spreading his ideas was Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-
1935), who published a journal, al-Manar (The Beacon), to which Abduh 
contributed legal rulings and reformist essays (Hashmi 2004a, c; de Bellaigue 2018: 
chapter 5).  
The First World War and the resulting break-up of the Ottoman empire put an 
end to pan-Islamism and liberal reformist currents gave way to movements that 
attempted to make an alleged ‘pure’ Islam, not tainted by liberal secular notions, fit 
for governing life in the twentieth century. An important role was played by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). 
Similar movements sprang up in other parts of the world with a large Muslim 
population. Muslim intellectuals in British India and, after the 1947 Partition, in 
Pakistan distinguished themselves specifically by developing ideas on how to 
organize the economy of an Islamic society. A pioneering role was played by 
Maulana or Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Maududi (1903-1979), the founder of the 
Islamist Jamaat e-Islami party (‘maulana’ or ‘mawlana’, literally ‘our master’, is an 
honorific title for religious Muslim scholars in South Asia). Maududi (also spelled 
Mawdudi or Maudoodi) wrote, as editor of a journal he founded in 1932 for 
Muslims in British India: “The plan of action I had in mind was that I should first 
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break the hold which Western culture and ideas had come to acquire over the 
Muslim intelligentsia, and to instil in them the fact that Islam has a code of life of its 
own, its own culture, its own political and economic systems and a philosophy and 
an educational system which are all superior to anything that Western civilization 
could offer. I wanted to rid them of the wrong notion that they needed to borrow 
from others in the matter of culture and civilization” (quoted in Slomp 2003: 240). 
The economic system thus figured explicitly in his plans for an Islamic revival 
(Kuran 2004: chapter 4). After delivering an address on the subject in 1941 
(Maududi 1941/1999), he went into more detail in several works on the principles 
that should govern an Islamic state (Maududi 1963, 1999). Others in India and later 
in Pakistan followed in his footsteps, in particular Anwar Iqbal Qureshi in 1946 
(Qureshi 1946), Naiem Siddiqhi in 1948 and Mahmud Ahmad in 1952 (see Gafoor 
1996: 37; Mahmud Ahmad 1999). In Egypt a prominent exponent of one of the 
more radical wings of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), wrote on 
the characteristics of an Islamic society, though without going into detail specifically 
on the economy, as Maududi had done (Hashmi 2004b). Qutb emphasized the idea 
of social justice in Islam (Qutb 2000; Damir-Geilsdorf 2018). He also preached 
violent action, first of all against leaders of Muslim countries who were seen to 
betray Islam. 
The ideas of these, and other, Islamic reformists paved the way for the 
establishment of Islamic financial institutions, which after some earlier small-scale 
experiments took off in the 1970s, when the oil states were awash with liquidity 
thanks to the oil crises. After a meeting of the foreign ministers of Islamic countries 
in Jeddah to discuss Islamic banking, the Nasser Social Bank of Egypt was set up in 
1971 with government support. It mainly provided qard hasan loans (interest-free 
loans against at best a very low administrative fee) to the poor and the needy, 
scholarships to students and micro-credit to small projects on a profit-and-loss 
sharing (PLS) basis (Abedifar et al. 2015). Another such meeting in late 1973 led to 
the foundation of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in 1974, which owed very 
much to the initiative of Egypt and Pakistan, arguably the cradles of twentieth-
century Islamic banking. It went open for business in 1975 and first helped oil-
importing countries cope with the oil crisis by buying oil and selling it to them on a 
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murabaha basis. Murabaha involves the purchase by a party, often a financier, of a 
good desired by another party, often the financier’s client. The financier sells the 
good on to the client with a markup, usually against deferred payment. The oil-
producing Gulf states provided most of IDB’s initial capital, as it was in their 
interest to sell oil to other Muslim-majority states and promptly be paid the full 
market price, without the resentment that balance-of-payment crises might otherwise 
cause in the importing countries (Wilson 2008). Private banking following Islamic 
principles also started in 1975, with the foundation of the Dubai Islamic Bank by a 
group of pious merchants (though with the governments of the UAE and Kuwait 
contributing respectively 20 percent and 10 per cent of the capital), followed by the 
Faisal Islamic Bank in Egypt and Sudan in 1977. 
In other sectors of the economy there had always been segments catering for the 
needs of pious Muslims, but following the lead of the finance industry we are now 
witnessing an increasingly internationally active Islamic ‘modest clothing’ industry 
for women, a specialized Islamic travel industry, an Islamic pharmaceuticals 
industry, an Islamic cosmetics industry and an Islamic media and recreation industry 
(see Thomson Reuters 2017). In this way the post-World War I reformers’ ideal of 
an Islamic economy is more and more taking shape, though they would perhaps not 
approve of the direction Islamic finance has taken. It is often seen as conventional 
banking made more complicated, not without some justification. 
 
 
3. World view behind the Islamic economy and a critique 
 
Now what are the distinguishing features of an Islamic economy? In the view of 
the likes of Maududi and Qutb and also more recent proponents of a specifically 
Islamic organization of the economy, Islam is fundamentally different from 
capitalism and communism. The latter two lack, in their view, a moral code. 
Capitalism lets individuals pursue their selfish ends without regard for the needs of 
others while communism imposes unacceptable restrictions to individual liberties 
and opportunities for self-fulfilment. Proponents of Islamic finance make much of 
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this moral code. This is a central notion of Islam: sharia is God’s universal moral 
law and both legal and moral laws ideally flow from it.  
As communism is no serious player at the moment, we will focus on the alleged 
superiority of the Islamic economy, and in particular Islamic finance, over 
capitalism. First, the presumed contrast between Islam and capitalism is highly 
questionable. Capitalism is often equated with Anglo-American free-market neo-
liberalism where huge firms have free play. However, insofar this really exists (the 
US is far from a free market) it is only one historical form of capitalism among 
many. Capitalism can be denoted as a way of organizing production. Capitalism is a 
system characterized by private ownership of the means of production (note that 
other definitions of capitalism are possible, see for a dazzling multitude of possible 
connotations Rodinson 2014: chapter I). Capitalism in this definition is not 
synonymous with a free market economy. Capitalism can exist in highly regulated 
societies, such as Nazi Germany, and on the other hand non-capitalist organizational 
forms can exist and even flower in more or less free market economies, think of 
cooperatives and the former Yugoslav communist market economy with workers’ 
self-management. Now Islamic economies arguably are, like most other economies, 
mixed economies with both private firms and government production of goods and 
services. The Islamic version distinguishes itself by an explicit moral code, said to 
be derived from divine law. A prominent feature of this moral code in economic life 
are the bans on riba, gharar and maysir, and on haram goods such as pork, alcohol 
and adult entertainment. What are these for? One of the most prominent scholars of 
Islamic finance, Professor M. Kabir Hassan of the University of New Orleans 
(Hassan 2017: 1) says: 
 
Islamic finance is built on a foundation of socioeconomic justice for all and 
sustainable growth facilitated by prudent stewardship of natural resources so that 
future generations may also enjoy the fruits of economic development. 
 
In the same vein, Dr Asad Zaman (Zaman 2015: 13), the Vice-Chancellor of the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Studies, maintains that 
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Since the spirit of Islam is in stark and violent conflict with the spirit of 
Capitalism, the form taken by institutions designed to express this spirit must 
also be different. Capitalist financial institutions are designed to support the 
process of accumulation of wealth, which is at the heart of capitalist societies. 
Central to Islam is the spirit of service, and spending on others, which is 
expressed by diverse, service-oriented institutions, radically different from 
those dominant in capitalist societies. 
 
These are far from modest claims, repeated in numerous publications (another 
influential one is a book by the prominent Muslim Brother Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 
2010). What is behind it? The ‘Thou shalt nots’ of the various bans may give a 
negative impression: you shouldn’t do this and you shouldn’t do that, but they have 
a positive purpose, namely to fulfil the maqasid al-shariah or goals, higher 
objectives, of Islamic law. These should bring about the socioeconomic justice 
mentioned by Hassan and already emphasized by Hassan al-Banna. There is a strong 
tendency among writers on Islamic finance and the Islamic economy in general to 
follow medieval scholars, and in this case the great philosopher Al-Ghazali (c.1058-
1111), who defined the maqasid al-sharia as safeguarding  
(a) people’s religion, broadly defined as their way of life 
(b) their life or soul 
(c) their family or offspring 
(d) their property or wealth  
(e) their intellect or reason, also interpreted as their dignity.  
These serve to promote their welfare or maslaha, the goodness of this life and 
the hereafter (Ghazanfar, Islahi 1990; 2011). However, one may wonder whether 
these norms are really that unique and insofar they are, to what degree they are 
reflected in day-to-day behaviour. The higher objectives certainly are not unique. 
Then why all the fuss? An answer can be found in another quote from M. Kabir 
Hassan (Hassan 2017: 2):  
 
Islamic economics and finance is gaining traction because much of the Muslim 
world wants to relive long-gone times when Islam was the dominant force driving 
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world history. Muslims believe they have a responsibility to extend the message 
of Allah’s final messenger to all humanity. (…) Now that Muslim states are 
politically free from their colonizers, they are seeking to cultivate their own 
home-grown, Islam-based systems of knowledge. Islamic economics and finance 
is part of this.  
 
And here we may have Des Pudels Kern, the gist of the matter: the Islamic 
economy or Islamic economics serves to throw off the frustration that drove the 
Islamic reformers at the end of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth century. 
Imagine: Islam claims to be the final, perfect religion, after Jews and Christians 
allegedly corrupted God’s revelation (see for instance Quran, Sura 5). It swept 
everything before it. In an astonishingly short time the armies of Islam conquered 
the Middle East, North Africa and most of the Iberian peninsula and in 732 or 733, 
only one century after the death of the prophet Muhammad, they had progressed as 
far as the region between Tours and Poitiers, where their push was halted by 
Frankish and Burgundian forces under Charles Martel. The cities of the Islamic 
world became centres of intellectual life and scholarship without equal in the whole 
of Europe. If it is so superior, how then is it possible that in the nineteenth century 
the Islamic world had become a mere shadow of its former self? That of course was 
hard to swallow. The Islamic economy then is one means for the umma, the global 
community of Muslims, to reassert itself (see on the concept of umma Widhiyoga 
2019). And that is indeed what an overwhelming majority of Islamic religious 
leaders find to applaud in Islamic finance, according to enquiries (Khan, Bhatti 
2018).  
Let us now go back to the claim that capitalism lacks a moral code, or an ethics. 
It is by no means only Muslims that condemn capitalism for encouraging greed, 
selfishness and corruption but also communists, socialists of all stripes and church 
leaders, think of the encyclical Rerum Novarum issued by pope Leo XIII in 1891, 
the encyclical Quadragesimo anno issued in 1931 by pope Pius XI and the almost 
ritual condemnation of capitalism by the World Council of Churches. Now it may be 
true that capitalism has an orientation to the accumulation of wealth and too often 
gives free play to unsavoury characters, but first you have to wear blinkers not to see 
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the same in the Islamic variant of capitalism, and second, the greed for gain is not 
the exclusive province of capitalists. Political power corrupts at least to the same 
degree, if not more. Both the power of capitalists and the power of political elites 
need to be held in check by countervailing power (Galbraith 1963). A very 
important and effective form of countervailing power is civil society with its fact-
finding by NGOs and the media and this flourishes best in mixed-economy 
parliamentary democracies (though even there NGOs and the media face 
harassment, see “The Economist” 2019). The Islamic world, certainly in the Gulf 
region, too often does not allow civic society to flourish,  
Capitalism is a structure for organizing the economy. If it is embedded in a 
market economy it is based on the notion that decentralized ownership and decision-
making makes the best use of human creative powers and helps to prevent 
centralizing too much power in the hands of the government, but that is not different 
in Islam. There is nothing in Islam that inherently is inimical to capitalism 
(Rodinson 2014), indeed, the first wife of the Prophet, Khadija, was a capitalist 
entrepreneur and he himself was one of her employees for a number of years. Over 
and above this basic foundation, capitalist market economies can harbour various 
ethical rules. These need not necessarily come from religion, though of course 
religions are extremely influential producers of ethical rules (and enforcers of rules 
of behaviour preferred by religious elites). Ethical rules can also be produced by 
nationalistic and political movements, such as communism and fascism (ethical 
rules or systems are not by definition always pleasant). A very important source of 
ethical rules is action by NGOs. Changing views on racism, homosexuality, 
corporate social responsibility, accountability of government, conservation of nature 
and animal rights have to a large extent been initiated by NGOs, and not by 
organized religion, often even against the opposition of organized religion or 
religious groups. Ethical rules can furthermore result out of confrontations between 
interest groups, for instance employers and employees, leading to changing views on 
labour rights and stakeholdership. Capitalism thus need not necessarily have the 
maximization of profits and shareholder value as its overriding objective. And 
whatever the defects of capitalism, it is the only system that fully makes use of the 
entrepreneurial qualities and the innovate power of the people. Karl Marx and 
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Friedrich Engels, who expected capitalism to collapse under its own contradictions, 
still talked about bourgeois capitalism as a system that had conjured up most 
impressive means of production and transport (“… die modern bürgerliche 
Gesellschaft, die so gewaltige Produktions- und Verkehrsmittel hervorgezaubert 
hat”; Marx, Engels 1890/1974). Some Muslim scholars who want to emphasize the 
uniqueness of Islam claim that Islam has a different epistemology than the capitalist 
world. They are not impressed by the productive powers so admired by Marx and 
Engels and flatly deny that there is any scarcity of resources. This is because “The 
Qur’an states that Allah has provided an abundance of everything that humankind 
needs in order to subsist” (Golestani 2018; in the same vein Cattelan 2018). If there 
is scarcity, that is because of limitations of mankind’s productive capacity, not of a 
lack of resources. The Islamic economy knows no scarcity, thanks to the ethical 
values of Islam. The well-off do not strive for ever more income and wealth and the 
less-well-off receive everything they need. An ideal somewhat removed from 
reality. 
Capitalism leaves room for various ethical systems, including Islamic ethics, 
and these systems are not mutually exclusive. Further, neither Islam nor any other 
religion can claim moral superiority. In the financial sector a case in point is Triodos 
Bank. Triodos Bank is a Dutch ethical bank that specializes in financing sustainable 
business. Khan and Mohomed (2017) confront Triodos Bank with Islami Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (IBBL), which they deem an ideal Islamic bank as it probably 
far exceeds other Islamic banks, in their words, “in terms of financial inclusion, 
microfinance, gender balance, SME financing and green banking while still being 
financially stable and profitable” (Khan, Mohomed 2017: 111). After a careful 
analysis of the banks’ business practices they conclude that Triodos Bank “has some 
significant lead over IBBL regarding ethical practices,” and if Triodos Bank exceeds 




                                                 
1 Islami Bank Bangladesh has since lost its lustre. In 2017 the government forced senior executives and 
board members of Islami Bank to resign because of the bank’s links with the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami 
party. In 2018 another purge followed. The new management has not maintained Islami Bank’s former 
high standards and just like in government-owned banks loans now often are granted to people with 
political connections, who have a poor track record when its comes to paying back their loans. The 
central bank of Bangladesh found many irregularities and breaches of financial regulations in Islami 
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There is little reason for self-congratulation for Islamic banks. Islamic finance is 
not of a completely different moral character than conventional finance. Indeed, it is 
a common complaint among Islamic observers that Islamic finance in practice 
comes down to mimicking the operations and products of conventional banking 
while nominally observing Islamic rules (e.g., El-Gamal 2006: 65, 138, 163; Asutay 
2012; Ayub 2017). It often boils down to ticking off boxes on a standard check list. 
In the other sectors of the Islamic economy things may be more clear-cut, but there 
too business practices will not differ much from conventional capitalist ones.  
 
 
4. The standard check list of Islamic economic ethics 
 
The Islamic economy wants to obey the injunctions of Islamic religious law. But 
while orthodox Jews would be content to follow God’s commandments and not 
necessarily understand what they are good for, the proponents of the Islamic 
economy strongly believe that the Islamic rules are beneficial for mankind (Alwani 
2016). The maqasid al-sharia reflect these claims. Let us now look how the three 
items on the standard check list of Islamic finance ethics score in this respect. These 
items are: 
(a) the ban on riba 
(b) the ban on gharar and maysir, 
(c) the ban on haram goods and services 
 
(a) the ban on riba 
A central plank in Islamic finance’s platform is the ban on interest. It is a moot 
point whether riba can really be equated with interest, but dissenters are few and far 
between (Suharto 2018). One form of riba concerned a pre-Islamic Arabic custom. If 
a debt was not paid on maturity (after one year), the principal was doubled, 
according to most commentators (for instance, Fazlur Rahman 1964; Qureshi 1991: 
                                                                                                                              
Bank’s loans (The government initiates a coup at Bangladesh’s biggest bank, “The Economist”, 6 April 
2017, Islami Bank Bangladesh has declined since a boardroom coup in 2017, “The Economist”, 6 
April 2019). Jamaat-e-Islami was allied with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, whose leader Khaleda 
Zia is the arch-foe of Sheikh Hasina Wajed, the prime minister and leader of the ruling Awami League. 
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54). Quran 3:130, which admonishes the believers not to devour “usury, doubled 
and multiplied,” most probably refers to this custom. The ban on riba was aimed, in 
the view of some commentators, at preventing the debtor getting enslaved. That 
would make the ban on riba from the Quran irrelevant for present-day banking and 
finance, as it would only bear on riba al-jahiliyya, the riba practised by the Arabs in 
the pre-Muslim “time of ignorance” (Rahman 1964; Kuran 1995: 156-157; R. 
Zaman 2011; El-Gamal 2019: 114-115). Nevertheless, fiqh scholars are adamant 
that riba includes interest.  
The deleterious effects of interest are extensively discussed in the Islamic 
literature. Interest makes the wealthy even more wealthy while they put no effort in 
it and it leads to exploitation of the weak, the borrower, by the strong, the lender. It 
is also averred that interest contributes to gambling with other people’s money (see 
Hassan 2017). This is the standard view, but it is a flawed one. First, it is not all true 
that the lender is always the strong party and the borrower the weak one. If you hold 
a time or savings deposit at a bank, the only power you have is to switch to another 
bank and one cannot reasonably claim that the depositors exploit the bank. 
Depositors have at best very weak power to dictate rates. Second, a very large part 
of savings is in the form of collective savings. Fixed-income securities are 
predominantly owned by pension funds and insurance companies. Pension plans that 
invest in fixed-income securities are not known as seriously increasing income 
disparities. Even abstracting from the low interest rates of the last decade or so, it 
can be maintained that interest as a cause of income and wealth disparities pales into 
insignificance alongside successful business ventures, grossly unequal pay, the rise 
of the gig economy, unequal access to education, political clout of the rich (which 
translates into low effective tax rates for the rich), tax evasion, cronyism, bribery, 
restrictions of market access in order to create rents (think of the vast business 
empires of the Egyptian army and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) and other shady 
dealings. What remains true is that borrowing against interest may result in 
gambling, or in very risky balance sheet ratios. Credit, including borrowing money 
(as distinct from buying against deferred payment), is an excellent means to help a 
business and individuals increase their opportunities, but it may easily get out of 
hand. The solution, however, is not to condemn debt per se, but to stop giving debt 
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favourable tax treatment, in other words to reduce or phase out tax deductibility of 
interest. Limits to loan-to-value ratios in mortgage finance can also help. The point 
is that interest-bearing debt is a useful tool in the financial instrument box, but that it 
should not be used excessively, in common with so much in human activities. Riba 
is equated with interest, but it has the connotation of excess, unearned income, a 
rent. Farooq (2012, 2019) argues that the fixation on interest has led to the neglect of 
many kinds of unjustified and unjust enrichment, including monopolies, rent-
seeking lobbying and rewarding contracts to privileged parties. The proponents of a 
separate Islamic epistemology tend to be blind to it. Golestani (2018) sees riba as 
one of the worst instruments of exploitation of human beings by other human beings 
and claims that it has been abolished root and branch by Islam. Quod non, see 
below, and rent seeking by sheltered or favoured firms also stays out of his purview 
(though he mentions bribery). 
The Islamic condemnation of interest is mistaken. Another question is whether 
the Islamic alternatives are fundamentally different. Interest on money loans is 
forbidden in Islamic finance. However, they fulfil a very useful role and the business 
community cannot easily do without. Islamic business firms cannot do without 
either, however much fiqh scholars would like to see debt replaced by profit-and-
loss sharing arrangements. Profit-and-loss sharing (musharaka) and profit sharing 
(mudaraba) arrangements are, however, beset with information and moral-hazard 
problems and are not very popular (see Visser 2019: 71-75). Buying goods on credit 
is allowed, but cannot fully fulfil the needs of Islamic business firms. The Islamic 
financial sector therefore takes recourse to hiyal, that is, legal fictions, tricks. A very 
popular Islamic contract for instance is tawarruq. In a tawarruq a financier buys 
commodities and sells these to its customer against deferred payment. The customer 
sells the goods against cash, or asks the financier to sell them as its agent. Usually 
the goods are immediately sold on. The end result is a money loan. A tawarruq deal 
is made up of separate contracts which are individually halal, and as the contracts 
are not formally dependent on each other either (which would imply gharar or 
avoidable uncertainty and is not allowed in Islamic contract law), tawarruq cannot 
be labelled haram, or so the reasoning goes. Still, it obviously aims at getting a 
money loan or investing money against a predetermined fixed payment (Ayub, Paldi 
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2015). Fiqh scholars of AAOIFI (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions) and the Fiqh Academy of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, two authoritative organizations that set standards for the Islamic finance 
industry, would love to reduce its use, but the need for it is overwhelming, not only 
among non-financial firms but also, in fact most of all, among the banks, which need 
it for cash management purposes (both for borrowing and investing funds). In the 
United Arab Emirates, Malaysia and Kuwait the central bank offers the commercial 
banks facilities for tawarruq-based short-term borrowing and investments (CBUAE 
2010). With tawarruq it can truly be said that Islamic finance is conventional finance 
made more complicated. Tawarruq is extremely popular. According to Sohaib Umar 
of the Central Bank of Bahrain it is the most widely-used Islamic finance product in 
Malyasia and Saudi Arabia. Out of a global total of US$1.7 trillion of outstanding 
Islamic financing in the mid-2010s some US$750 to 800 billion was estimated to 
consist of tawarruq assets (Umar 2015). 
 
(b) The ban on gharar and maysir 
This ban sounds very innocuous and even sympathetic: there should not be any 
ambiguity or avoidable uncertainty in contracts, gharar, and you should not practice 
speculation, maysir. Now speculation is a slippery concept, it means trying to profit 
from intertemporal price differences, but in this wide definition a choice between 
renting and buying a home is also a question of speculation. If we interpret it in a 
narrower way as something like cornering the market and then charge extortionate 
prices, most people will probably agree it is despicable. Note that Tenach/the Old 
Testament also condemns it. Proverbs 11:26 says, in the King James version: 
 
He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be upon 
the head of him that selleth it. 
 
Or, in a modern translation: 
Him who monopolises grain, the people curse - but blessings upon the head of 
him who distributes it! (New American Bible, United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, http://www.nccbuscc.org/nab/bible/proverbs/proverb11.htm) 
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However, the ban on maysir is not completely innocuous; it has, jointly with the 
ban on gharar, a great impact on insurance activities for Muslims. Fiqh scholars see 
conventional insurance as tainted by both gharar and maysir. Gharar is involved 
because there is ambiguity in the contract: policy holders do not exactly know what 
they will receive in return – it may be nothing, it may be a million euros. It is also 
seen as gambling or speculation, maysir, if you pay your insurance premium and 
receive either nothing or much more than your accumulated premiums in return 
(Maududi 1999: 288). The conventional idea that you buy security is rejected. 
However, if you pay premiums to Islamic takaful or mutual insurance companies, 
you buy security in the same way as with a conventional insurance policy. Running 
a takaful firm is complicated and policy holders are not always well served (see 
Visser 2019: 151-155). 
Another problem is that, as noted above, fiqh scholars consider contracts that are 
dependent on each other as guilty of gharar, because the fulfilment of one contract is 
a condition for the validity of the other, which introduces avoidable uncertainty with 
respect to the fulfilment of the contractual obligations. The result is that you have, 
for instance, first to make sure that finance is available before you buy a house, you 
cannot make a purchase conditional on finding finance as that would create 
ambiguity. Furthermore, it is very difficult to hedge risks, such as foreign exchange 
risks, first because conventional hedging products are interest-related, but second 
because Islamic variants have to circumvent the non-dependency rule. Hedging 
usually consists of more than one agreement combined in one contract. Recent 
solutions for this probems involve one-sided promises, wa’ds, but these do not 
provide the same level of legal certainty as a conventional derivative. Such wad’s 
are also involved in ijara wa iqtina, hire-purchase (see Visser 2019: chapter 4, 
section 4.4.6). 
 
(c) the ban on haram goods and services 
Here we have the same phenomenon as noted above on interest: avoiding 
excesses is better than an outright ban. But Muslims have little choice if they take 
the bans in the Quran and the Hadith seriously, though it is not immediately obvious 
to non-Muslims that the Islamic ethics system is superior to other systems in this 
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respect. This will be clear for instance if we look at the ban on many forms of 
entertainment. On this category the Quran and the Hadith are less clear than on other 
categories. Fiqh scholars restrict the choices people can make in varying degrees. 
Arguably people should be not be forced to live in a very narrowly restricted way, 
just to please a number of strict ulama and fiqh scholars who detest modernity. 
Moreover, vibrant city life with an innovation-oriented population is not possible if 
there is no room for experiments in all sectors of life, including entertainment. It is 
telling that when the strict Almoravids and after them Almohads took over Cordoba 
in 1090 respectively 1147, not only the Jewish philosopher Moses ben Maimon, or 
Maimonides, had to flee to Baghdad, but that the Almoravid burned al-Ghazali’s 
manuscripts more than once (Garnier 2018: 102) and the Almohads expelled the 
great Islamic scholar Ibn Rushd, or Averroes. Puritanical masters kill freedom, fun 
and creativity.  
  
 
5. Areas of relative neglect 
 
The Islamic economy has lofty ideals but there is a large gap between those 
ideals and actual practice. Mimicking conventional finance while meeting a series of 
requirements in order to formally meet sharia norms does not lift an institution to a 
different ethical plane. Moreover, sticking to al-Ghazali’s old list of maqasid al-
sharia has led to a lack of attention to a number of issues that in the present global 
situation are felt to be essential for people’s wellbeing and the preservation of the 
planet, such as justice, human rights, universal education, accountability and 
transparency, environmental protection, animal rights and corporate social 
responsibilities. The Islamic world was confronted with the issue by outside 
pressure. It has been reported for instance that Australian cattle exports to Malaysia 
fell from over 50,000 head in 2015 to 21,330 in 2017, largely because Australian 
producers are not allowed to export cattle for ritual slaughter. This is because 
exporters are held responsible under Australian law for ensuring that the entire 
supply chain conforms to Australian standards, even after the cattle has left the 
country, and Australian authorities have grown increasingly critical of Malaysia’s 
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standards of animal welfare. Slaughter practices at religious festivals have been 
found espcially worrying and Australian producers were in 2018 not allowed to sell 
cattle, nor sheep and goats, to Malaysia for ritual slaughter.
2
 Another issue 
concerning the thought complex of the Islamic economy is income distribution. 
True, there are a few voices calling for including some of these items among the 
maqasid al-sharia, but so far they are a small minority (Khan 2016; Opwis 2017). 
We now zoom in on two of the issues where the Islamic economy still has a lot 
of catching up to do: (a) ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance), (b) income 
distribution. 
 
(a) ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) 
Under the ESG label we include CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) and SRI 
(Socially Responsible Investment). In principle following the sharia should include 
everything encompassed by these notions, initiatives in these areas should thus be 
superfluous for Islamic financial institutions and Islamic organizations in general. It 
is argued, for instance, that “From an Islamic perspective, social responsibility 
exercised by a business organization is seen as a benefit, rather than as a cost (…) 
Individuals and businesses are encouraged to sacrifice, give and spend their wealth 
for the poor and needy, in view of the afterlife recognition. This sense of duty, 
responsibility, and spirit of sacrifice, nourished by the Islamic religion, serves to 
remove egocentrism and greed and to promote the compassion, care, cooperation 
and harmony of the community” (Litardi et al. 2019). There is much overlap with 
the conventional emphasis in corporate social responsibility on People, Planet and 
Profit, though, as Litardi et al. note, the Islamic approach includes a religious 
element. This includes fear of the consequences for the afterlife if God’s commands 
are not obeyed (the concept of divine grace and forgiveness which figures 
prominently in Christianity and to which there are some parallels in Buddhist Pure 
Land schools is largely absent in Islam). As everywhere else, there is some 
divergence between principles and practice. Litari et al. note that there is very little 
evidence of a real practical commitment to implement CSR and to social reporting 
                                                 
2 Eid al Adha festival of sacrifice heaps pressure on Malaysia to fix its livestock supply chain, 
www.salaamgateway.com, 22 August 2018. 
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among large Arab companies. Khan and Usman (2016) studied vision statements, 
mission statements and annual reports of five Islamic banks in Pakistan and asked 
bank managers about CSR practices followed by these banks. It turned out that the 
banks paid attention to the needs of society and the community, while only two of 
the five banks mentioned the environment. The welfare of employees and customers 
was neglected. The authors did not investigate the actual practices of the banks, but 
a failure to mention an item in mission statements and annual reports is not a good 
omen. It has further been found that a couple of Islamic banks in Malaysia pay 
attention to the environmental impact of their offices, but that they generally do not 
consider environmental and social risks when approving financing. Subsidiaries of 
foreign banks usually are more environmentally conscious, thanks to their 
international shareholders (Kunhibava et al. 2018: 145-146). And while the 
Sustainable Development Goals of the UN are being addressed by a couple of banks 
in Malaysia and Indonesia, Islamic banks from the Gulf region were hardly 
interested (Thomson Reuters 2018: 29). San José and Cuesta (2019) note that 
Islamic finance is more focused on formal sharia compliance than on social and 
environmental goals.  
Islamic financial institutions and their advocates emphasize their contribution to 
responsible finance, while tending to neglect such initiatives as the UN Global 
Compact. This is the more remarkable as the Islamic Development Bank and its 
private sector arm, the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private 
Sector (ICD), give their full support to the Sustainable Development Goals of the 
United Nations. Participants in the UN Global Compact commit themselves to obey 
a set of principles on human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption in 
their activities and to contribute to broader societal goals such as the UN Social 
Development Goals. The few Islamic firms among the 885 financial institutions that 
participated as per 1 September 2016 mainly belonged to groups that were not 
exclusively Islamic, based in non-Muslim-majority countries.
3
 Such initiatives as the 
UN Global Compact, the United Nations’ Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative Principles for Responsible Banking (UNEP-FI) and the Dubai Declaration 
                                                 
3 ‘UN Global Compact lacks Islamic banking participation’, IFN Alerts, 
islamicfinancenews@redmoneygroup.com, 12 February 2016. 
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of Financial Institutions in the UAE on Sustainable Finance also find a very 
lukewarm response from Islamic financial institutions.
4
  
In the social sphere the record is not impressive either. Like their conventional 
peers from countries lacking critical monitoring by NGOs and groups of 
shareholders, Islamic financial institutions tend to pay no attention to labour 
conditions in the projects financed by them, even if these were reported to be 
extremely poor on the building sites in the Gulf countries Bahrain, Qatar and Dubai 
in which they were heavily involved (Leins 2010; Amnesty International 2013). The 
lot of foreign labour in the UAE seems to have improved somewhat by reforms 
introduced in 2011 and 2016 after fierce international criticism, by giving them 
somewhat more freedom to change jobs, but domestic workers remained helpless 
against misbehaving employers, and then the reforms only applied to the UAE 
where it is unclear what effect they have (“The Economist” 2016; Fanack 2018). 
Bad treatment of labour is clearly contrary to Islamic ethical principles, but there are 
no formal Islamic labour codes. The codes developed by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations, however, seem to be fully in conformity 
with Islamic principles and could easily be adopted by governments of Islamic-
majority countries (Reda 2016). In this area there is still a lot to do for them. 
One area that has especially suffered from neglect was corporate governance. 
While standard ESG screening includes corporate governance, sharia screening of 
Islamic investment does not (Pathan 2016). For banks, it is far from universal. The 
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) describes corporate governance as 
follows: 
 
Corporate governance refers to the way in which private and public companies, 
enterprises, entrepreneurship and financial institutions are governed and run in 
relation to their purpose, values, ownership, representation, accountability, 
financing, investment, performance, leadership, direction, management, 




                                                 
4 Dubai Declaration on sustainable finance welcomes first and only fully-fledged Islamic financial 
institution, IFN Alerts, islamicfinancenews@redmoneygroup.com, 1 September 2017. 
5 http://www.ecgi.global/content/about-ecgi [30.06.2018]. 
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The concept in this formulation includes a smorgasbord of issues, but it boils 
down to the question whether an organization is run decently, with “decently” 
having a different connotation for different groups of people in different regions and 
different times. Transparency and accountability can be seen as key elements in any 
definition. 
The Islamic finance literature is fully aware of the fact that Islamic financial 
institutions often exhibit serious deficiencies in the area of corporate governance. 
Things are made more complex in Islamic finance than in conventional finance 
because of the former’s peculiarities. For instance, holders of investment accounts in 
Islamic banks should periodically receive a part of the bank’s profits, but the bank 
may decide to prevent low payments to investment account holders in lean years to 
prevent them defecting to competitors. This raises an agency problem, and thus to a 
corporate governance problem, as such payments go at the expense of profits left to 
shareholders. Then, investment account holders can only vote with their feet, but 
only after the investment has matured. They simply have to trust the bank managers 
to invest the funds such that the interests of the investors are best served. They run 
the same risks as shareholders, but unlike shareholders they have no voice in 
appointing managers nor can they withhold their approval of the annual accounts. 
Supervisors in a number of jurisdictions therefore allow deposit guarantees for 
investment accounts in order to limit the downward risks, which is at variance with 
the profit sharing or profit-and-loss sharing character of the Islamic investment 
funds. But already on a more basic level there are plenty of corporate governance 
problems. Sairally (2013) notes that the Islamic banks tend to restrict themselves to 
making sure that formal legal and sharia norms are observed and economic 
responsibilities are met. And even here they are often lax. Ayaz and Mansoori 
(2017) point to incompetent board members, moral hazard and sloppy risk 
management. All these elements became glaringly apparent in a notorious case of 
repeated fraud at Dubai Islamic Bank in the 1990s and early 2000s, when after fraud 
was detected the directors preferred a hush-hush approach over taking strong 
measures to prevent fraud in future (Mukmimin 2018). Even sharia compliance is 
not guaranteed. There are numeral voices in the Islamic world calling for taking 
corporate social responsibility more serious. Some authors think that Islamic ethics 
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is the answer to all governance problems and that there is no need to look further. 
Zainuldin et al. (2018), after elaborating on the various governance problems in 
Islamic banks, blithely state that consultative consultation, that is allowing all 
stakeholders to contribute to the decision-making process, is the way to ensure that 
Islamic ethics rule the process so that everybody takes account of other peoples’ 
interests and no dishonesty will occur. As Islamic ethics is based on presumed 
divine revelation, it is important to support any proposal with references to the 
prophet Muhammad and Zainuldin et al. argue that consultative (shuratic) decision-
making characterized the leadership of the prophet and the caliphs (the worldly and 
spiritual leaders of the Muslim community) after him. In their view conventional 
agency theory neglects ethical stances, but their conclusion that “the Islamic ethical 
system incorporated in their business activities forms Islamic banks into 
organisations that place higher ethical considerations and therefore makes Islamic 
banks to have less severe agency problems compared to conventional banks” looks 
like wishful thinking dressed up as a fact. A sharia-based ethics would at the very 
least require something like a unified sharia governance framework, but it has been 
found, for instance, for Bangladesh that such a framework is lacking and that it is 
left to the banks how they apply the sharia principles. It is argued that this lax 
attitude by the banking supervisory authorities leads to poor accounting practices, 
financial products that do not fully comply with the sharia, questionable 
organization of the banks’ shariah boards and lack of information for the 
stakeholders (Alam et al. 2019). 
To end this section on a postive note, Islamic-majority countries, like the rest of 
the world, no longer shut their eyes for environmental problems and the depletion of 
natural resources. Projects for greening the economy are proliferating, especially in 
oil-exporting countries that have the funds and want to diversify the economy in 
time for the expected future run-down of oil and gas production, first of all the UAE. 
Islamic financial institutions have responded to this new awareness of environmental 
issues, stimulated by the Islamic Development Bank, and offer their services to issue 
green sukuk for that purpose. It is a market that started in the second half of the 
2010s and promises fast growth (Soo 2017). Furthermore, Islamic ESG-oriented 
investment funds have slowly appeared over the 2010s, with Malaysia in the lead, 
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again with the active support of the Islamic Development Bank. Furthermore, 
investors increasingly include corporate social responsibility in their investment 
criteria and investment funds have to respond to these requirements. There is thus a 
ready market for debt and equity that meet ESG principles. Islamic pension funds 
start to follow this trend. Also, central banks or Ministries of Finance are setting up 
central sharia boards that issue obligatory guidelines for Islamic financial 
institutions. Some examples are Indonesia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Oman, 
Pakistan, Sudan, Nigeria and the UAE; followed by the Central Bank of Iraq which 
announced in October 2019 that it is establishing a national sharia board. 
All in all, it is probably fair to conclude that in the light of ESG and associated 
standards Islamic financial institutions cannot claim to play in another ethical league 
than conventional ones and even generally belong to the laggards.  
(b). Income distribution 
There is a strong emphasis in the fiqh on the need to provide the poor with 
sufficient income to survive in a relatively decent manner and preferably to supply 
them with the means to earn an income that enables them to meet their basic needs. 
Rising above that minimum is, however, generally seen as their own responsibility. 
This is inherent in Islamic views on income and wealth (Allheedan 2016). It is in the 
first place the responsibility of family members to support each other, the wider 
community only comes into view if dire poverty has to be averted and relatives are 
unable to offer sufficient support (Alwani 2016).  
Muslim authors make much of zakat, in particular zakat mal, the obligatory 
wealth tax of Islam, as a means to combat poverty. An influential advocate of 
Islamic finance, Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, calls zakat one of the two main 
pillars of Islam’s economic system, the other one being the abolition of riba (Siddiqi 
1983: 36). Yusuf al-Qaradawi calls it a unique institution and a measure of far-
reaching economic consequences: 
 
“On the one hand it is a means of spiritual purification and on the other a way to 
regain balance and equilibrium in social and economic life (al-Qaradawi 2000, 
vol. I: i).” 
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Others praise it as “a system through which a Muslim society can eradicate 
poverty and inequalities,” while admitting that its potential is not fully exploited 
(Bashir et al. 2012; Bashir 2018). Zakat is, however, not a very fair tax. The assets 
subject to zakat make up a lower percentage of richer people’s portfolio than of the 
poorer part of the population, in particular if the latter are working in agriculture or 
as artisans. That is because the set of zakatable items heavily draws on the Quran 
and the Hadith, that of course leave out products that did not yet exist at the time, 
while the application of analogy as a method in jurisprudence has not remedied the 
discrepancy. The fact that the fiqh scholars are far from unanimous on the set of 
zakatable items does not help either and offers wide scope for the well-heeled to 
take their obligations lightly (see on the complex discussions which assets are 
zakatable: Rehman, Ahmedov 2011; Sadeq 2002, or the brief survey in Visser 2019: 
chapter 3, section 3.3). Zakat is, furthermore, not a very effective tax because it only 
brings in low amounts of money. Figures from the Islamic Research and Training 
Institute (IRTI), a subsidiary of the Islamic Development Bank, for a couple of 
Muslim-majority countries do not exceed 0.3 per cent of GDP: zakat collected in 
Malaysia amounted to 0.24 per cent of GDP in 2011, 0.025 per cent of GDP in 
Indonesia in 2012 and 0.06 per cent of GDP in Pakistan in 2010-2011 (Islamic 
Social Finance Report 2014: 42), while in Sudan in 2013 it brought in 0.3 per cent of 
GDP (absolute sum in Islamic Social Finance Report 2015: 40 combined with GDP 
figure from World Bank). In Brunei Darussalam zakat collection fluctuated between 
0.05 per cent and 0.12 per cent of GDP between 2001 and 2017 (Bashir et al. 2012). 
Moreover, zakat is not only used for helping the poor and people suffering from 
temporary misfortune, but also for dawah, that is, spreading the message of Islam, 
for the propagation of an Islamic way of life and for the people administering the 
zakat funds: 
 
 In fact the sadaqat [zakat] collection is for the poor, the helpless, those employed 
to administer the funds, those whose hearts need to be won over [to the truth], 
ransoming the captives, helping the destitute, in the Way of Allah and for the 
wayfarer. That is a duty enjoined by Allah; and Allah is All-Knowledgeable, Wise 




The distribution of the funds over the categories varies widely, not only between 
countries but also between regions within a country, but generally the poor and 
destitute receive much less than the full zakat receipts, the more so as collection 
costs can easily exceed ten per cent, in Sudan hovering around 20 per cent (figures 
in Islamic Social Finance Report 2014: 47; Islamic Social Finance Report 2015: 47). 
The glorification of zakat by fiqh scholars is another sign of their focus on the past. 
The sums needed in present-day societies for social purposes can only be brought in 
by taxes and social-security premiums. One can only agree with Muhammad Umer 
Chapra when he sees zakat not as a replacement for tax- and premium-funded social 
insurance but as a social self-help measure of the Muslim society to support the poor 
and destitute who for some reason fall through the social safety net (Chapra 1992: 
274). It is to be noted that compliance with the obligation to pay zakat mal is low. It 
has been argued that much higher zakat collection levels should be possible, figures 
as high as 7.25% of GDP have been quoted in the case of Pakistan (Shaikh 2017). If 
this is correct, zakat could make a difference, even if it would still be insufficient to 
meet social expenditure on the scale required now. 
In Islam there seems to be no urgent feeling that providing a minimum is 
perhaps not enough and that inequality in itself should not be exorbitant, though all 
Muslims and in particular the rich are encouraged to give generously above the 
obligatory zakat al-mal. One occasion is the annual eid al-fitr, or the Festival of 
Breaking the Fast, at the end of Ramadan, when Muslims are asked to give zakat al-
fitr for the benefit of the poor, or directly to the poor. Additional charity (sadaqah) is 
applauded; al-Qaradawi (2010: 102) quotes a saying of the prophet Muhammad: 
 
I shall give alms to the poor again and again till each of them comes to possess at 
least one hundred camels (al-Qaradawi 2010: 102). 
 
Still, it is only the genuinely poor whose poverty is not the result of their own 
negligence or unwillingness to look for work outside their own region who should 
be eligible for help, and even then it is first of all the duty of their relatives to 
provide assistance (al-Qaradawi 2010: 46ff). For all the quotes from the Hadith that 
THE ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
79 
fill the pages of publications by the likes of al-Qaradawi, the Islamic world, and 
especially the Middle East, cuts a relatively poor figure when it comes to income 
distribution. A study on incomes and income distribution in the Middle East shows 
that the region does worse than other regions in the world (Alvaredo et al. 2017). 
Admittedly, such figures should be interpreted with some caution, countries from 
the Middle East, and North Africa for that matter, do not cut such a poor figure if we 
look at Gini coefficients of income or consumption distribution – but on the other 
hand the rich may have all kinds of wealth and income items that stay below the 
radar of statistical bureaus (not only in the Middle East).  
 
Top 1% income share six regions, 2015, in per cent 
Brazil    28 
Middle East   26 
India (2014)   22 
USA    20 
China    14 
Western Europe  12________________________ 
Note: distribution of pretax national income (before taxes and transfers, except pensions and 
unemployment insurance) among equal-split adults (income of households divided equally 
among adult members) (source: Alvaredo et al. 2017). 
 
The argument here bore on the contention that zakat is an adequate instrument to 
combat poverty, and with widespread views on income distribution in the Islamic 
world. This is in no way meant as a judgement of individual charitable giving by 
Muslims, sadaqah. Still, the claim of those who flatly deny that there is any scarcity 
of natural resources and that Islam has already had achieved much in reducin 
poverty and exploitation sounds a bit hollow. 
 
 
6. Final comments 
 
It is one thing to extol the ethics of Islam, but it is unfair to compare the Islamic 
ideals with the practice of other thought systems or world views. Ideals of the one 
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should be compared with ideals of the others and practices of the one with the 
practices of the others, and above all every society should compare its ideals with its 
own practices. There are few societies where the results will not be sobering. As for 
Islam, remember the conviction of Dr Asad Zaman that “Central to Islam is the 
spirit of service, and spending on others.” Even if Islamic ethics were superior, 
Islamic behaviour is not. Quite a number of Muslim-majority countries score for 
instance very poorly on the 2018 Corruption Perception Index of Transparency 
International. Some countries do quite well: the United Arab Emirates scores rank 
23, equal with Uruguay and just below the United States, Brunei Darussalam shares 
rank 31 with Taiwan, Qatar has rank 33, just above Israel, and all these countries 
score better than Spain and Italy. However, Malaysia, not exactly an underdeveloped 
failed state, scores a lowly rank 61, Tunisia and Morocco both 73, Turkey 78 and 
Kuwait 78, Indonesia 89, Egypt and Algeria both 105, Pakistan 117, Iran 138, 
Mauritania 144 and Afghanistan and Sudan 172 (Transparency International 2019; 
the list ranks 180 countries). Muslim-majority countries have little reason to look 
down on the ethical behaviour of non-Muslims. Farooq (2019) has every reason to 
find it extremely shameful that countries that call themselves an Islamic Republic 
and/or publicly profess to follow the sharia (Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, 
Mauritania, Sudan and Afghanistan) have such a poor score on the Corruption 
Perception Index. 
Even more shameful are the human rights violations committed by a number of 
governments of Muslim-majority countries, including governments that actively 
support the spread of Islam and present themselves as modern, open societies (think 
oil-rich smaller Gulf states, see Fanack 2018). Now this can be seen as the cynical 
behaviour of political elites that do everything to stay in power. Quite another thing 
are the deep-seated convictions among the Muslim populace, based on their 
understanding of the sharia. According to research by Pew Research Center the 
percentage of the Muslim population that was in favour of stoning people who had 
committed adultery was over 80 in Egypt and Pakistan, 70 in Jordan, roughly 42 in 
Indonesia, some 23 in Lebanon and around 17 in Turkey (“The Economist” 2011). 
Non-Muslims should be pardoned for not feeling ethically inferior if they do not 
share such ideas.  
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Not to remain in a negative mode, it cannot be denied that there are positive 
developments on the neglected issues. Environmental problems are slowly but 
surely receiving more attention from governments and the business community, just 
as in the rest of the world simply because they can no longer be neglected. Water 
management and renewable energy are getting more prominence, with the United 
Arab Emirates in the vanguard. Just as in Christianity, in Islam man is seen as God’s 
steward or vice-regent, and Muslims can see it as a task assigned by God to take 
care of the earth (Quran 2: 30, 35: 39). So there is room for cooperation between 
Muslims and others on these issues – though the whole idea of mankind in a special 
position mandated to rule the earth has come under attack recently because it is held 
responsible for ruining the earth and for institutionalised cruelty to animals (Harari 
2014: 465). Be that as it may, the identity politics of the Islamic world do not 
necessarily stand in the way of joint action, the Islamic Development Bank for 
instance wholeheartedly supports the Development Goals of the United Nations. 
Still, as Prof. Mahmoud El-Gamal noted, 
 
The modus operandi of Islamic finance is worrisome for two reasons: it glorifies 
irrational adherence to outdated medieval jurisprudence, and supports the 
development of a separatist and boastful Islamic identity (El-Gamal 2007a).  
 
El-Gamal would prefer cooperative forms of finance that meet ethical norms and 
sees no need for a separate specifically Islamic financial sector (El-Gamal 2007b). 
He tends to see Islamic finance first of all as a form of capitalist Islamism sponsored 
by the Gulf states and adopted by other states, all competing for petrodollars. He 
expects Islamic finance not to survive a drying-up of the stream of petrodollars (El-
Gamal 2019). However, the Islamic economy is more than Islamic finance, it is 
more and more an integrated whole of Islamic products and services that may bring 
a more uniform lifestyle to Muslim communities in different continents. The 
crumbling of the American-led post-second-world-war rule-based world order 
means that more tribal sentiments come to the fore; identity politics receive a boost 
and the Islamic economy is an important element in this process. 
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A tricky question for an economist to answer is whether behind the tendency of 
the advocates of Islamic finance to rely on medieval fiqh scholars there does not lie 
a more fundamental question, a question that plagues all religions that rely on holy 
scriptures: how to square allegedly divine revelation from far more than a 
millennium ago with the exigencies of modern life and the results of centuries of 
scientific discoveries? Do all injunctions in the scriptures still apply now? 
Discussion of the nature of divine revelation and its application today can easily 
become dangerous in the Islamic world. Liberal reformers such as Fazlur Rahman 
(1919-1988), who had to flee Pakistan for the United States, found out the hard way 
that the more strict factions within Islam are strong enough to have deviations from 
traditional views on divine revelation declared anathema (see on Fazlur Rahman Birt 
1996). The philologist Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd (1943-2010) was declared an apostate 
for similar reasons and saw himself forced to move from Egypt to the Netherlands 
(for his views on divine revelation, see Abu Zayd 2000). Earlier, Muhammad Abduh 
also met with fierce opposition. In Christianity by contrast, sixteenth-century 
Protestant reformers in Switzerland, in particular John Calvin (1509-1564), held that 
much of the divine revelation in the Old Testament (Tenach) applied specifically to 
the Jewish people living at that time and is not binding on later generations (Biéler 
2005: 400-422). Such ideas are now widely accepted. And then, organized religion 
has largely lost its hold on society, in Western Europe at least, and increasingly also 
in the America’s. In Islam there is the additional problem that the Hadith is assigned 
equal status with the Quran, while it is not obvious (to an outsider at least) that the 
prophet Muhammad’s utterings on issues that were important in his time should be 
given equal status with God’s supposedly immutable commands for later 
generations. It looks reasonable to reason that the prophet Muhammad accepted 
slavery, for instance, like St Paul did half a millennium earlier, simply because it 
was the normal thing in his time and not because of some divine instruction. Raising 
such questions is something many Muslims will not easily do, as rational analysis 
and research in matters of religion tends to be seen as tainted by waswas, flusterings 
of Shaytain, or Satan, meant to throw doubt in the minds of the believers about the 
truth of the Quran and the Hadith. Better to accept what the Prophet said 
unquestiongly and this, especially in the minds of Wahabites and other salafist, 
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preferably as interpreted by medieval jurists such as Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328). 
This attitude leads them to defend and even advocate such abominations as child 
brides, amputation of hands or feet, and beheading, crucifixion and stoning 
(according to Ibn Taymiyya, harsh punishments are an expression of God’s mercy, 
as they help His worshippers remember His ordinances; even the condemned will 
accept the punishments if the ruler imposes them for the wellbeing of his subjects, 
Ibn Taymiyya 2019:169-170). Still, there are voices advocating a reinterpretation of 
the Quran and the Hadith taking into account the social and economic changes that 
have taken place since these were written down (M.A. Khan 2016). They refrain, 
though, from radical ideas on divine revelation. 
It looks reasonable to expect the identity aspect to play a prominent role for a 
considerable period of time (see Hassan 2017: 2, quoted above). The umma wants to 
make its presence felt again and be taken seriously. This is fully understandable, but 
this goes hand in hand with the idea that Islamic ethical norms are superior. First, to 
a non-Muslim observer they are not, and second, there is a disconnect between the 
ideals and the real world. A problem for many Muslims themselves may be that if 
the development of the various sectors of an Islamic economy makes it possible to 
keep away from conventional providers, the pressure on them to conform to strict 
norms may increase and turn into coercion (see on bigotry among European 
Muslims Koopmans 2015). Group pressure is another aspect of Islam, or rather 
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